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Abstract: AI algorithms seek inspiration from human cognitive systems in areas where 
humans outperform machines. But on what level should algorithms try to approximate 
human cognition? We argue that human-like machines should be designed to make 
decisions in transparent and comprehensible ways, which can be achieved by accurately 
mirroring human cognitive processes. 
How to build human-like machines? We agree with the authors’ assertion that “reverse 
engineering human intelligence can usefully inform AI and machine learning” (p. 6) and 
in this commentary we offer some suggestions concerning the direction of future 
developments. Specifically, we posit that human-like machines should not only be built 
to match humans in performance, but also to be able to make decisions that are both 
transparent and comprehensible to humans. 
First, we argue that human-like machines need to decide and act in transparent ways, 
such that humans can readily understand how their decisions are made (see Arnold & 
Scheutz, 2016; Indurkhya & Misztal-Radecka, 2016; Mittelstadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter, 
& Floridi, 2016). Behavior of artificial agents should be predictable and people 
interacting with them ought to be in a position that allows them to intuitively grasp how 
those machines decide and act the way they do (Malle & Scheutz, 2014). This poses a 
unique challenge for designing algorithms. 
In current neural networks there is typically no intuitive explanation for why a network 
reached a particular decision given received inputs (Burrell, 2016). Such networks 
represent statistical pattern recognition approaches that lack the ability to capture agent-
specific information. Lake et al. acknowledge this problem and call for structured 
cognitive representations, which are required for classifying social situations. 
Specifically, the authors’ proposal of an “intuitive psychology” is grounded in the naïve 
utility calculus framework (Jara-Ettinger, Gweon, Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2016). 
According to this argument, algorithms should attempt to build a causal understanding of 
observed situations by creating representations of agents who seek rewards and avoid 
costs in a rational way.  
Putting aside extreme examples (e.g., killer robots and autonomous vehicles), let us look 
at the more casual AI task of scene understanding. Cost-benefit based inferences about 
situations such as the one depicted in the left-most picture in Figure 6 in Lake et al. (p. 
39) will likely conclude that one agent has a desire to kill the other and that he or she
values higher the state of the other being dead than alive. While we do not argue this is 
necessarily wrong, a human-like classification of such a scene would likely lead to the 
conclusion that the scene depicts either a legal execution or a murder. The returned 
alternative depends on the viewer’s inferences about agent-specific characteristics. 
Making such inferences requires going beyond the attribution of simple goals – one needs 
to make assumptions about the roles and obligations of different agents. In the discussed 
example, although both a sheriff and a contract killer would have the same goal to end 
another person’s life, the difference in their identity would change the human 
interpretation in a significant way. 
We welcome the applicability of naïve utility calculus for inferring simple information 
concerning agent-specific variables, such as goals or competence level. At the same time, 
however, we would like to point out some caveats inherent to this approach. Humans 
interacting with the system will likely expect a justification of why it has picked one 
interpretation rather than another and algorithm designers might want to take this into 
consideration. 
This leads us to our second point. Models of cognition can come in at least two flavors: 
(1) as-if models, which only aspire to achieve human-like performance on a specific task
(e.g., classifying images), and (2) process models, which seek to both achieve human-like 
performance and to accurately reproduce the cognitive operations humans actually 
perform (classifying images by combining pieces of information in a way humans do). 
We believe that the task of creating human-like machines ought to be grounded in 
existing process models of cognition. Indeed, investigating human information 
processing is helpful for ensuring that generated decisions are comprehensible (i.e., that 
they follow human reasoning patterns). 
Why is it important that machine decision mechanisms, in addition to being transparent, 
actually mirror human cognitive processes in a comprehensible way? In the social world, 
people often judge agents not only according to the agents’ final decisions, but also 
according to the process by which they have arrived at these (e.g., Hoffman, Yoeli, & 
Nowak, 2015). It has been argued that the process of human decision-making does not 
typically involve rational utility maximization (e.g., Hertwig & Herzog, 2009). This in 
turn influences how we expect other people to make decisions (Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 
2010). To the extent that one cares about the social applications of algorithms and their 
interactions with people, considerations about transparency and comprehensibility of 
decisions become critical.  
While as-if models relying on cost-benefit analysis might be reasonably transparent and 
comprehensible, for instance, when problems are simple and do not involve moral 
considerations, this might not always be the case. Algorithm designers need to ensure that 
the underlying process will be acceptable to the human observer. What research can be 
drawn up to help build transparent and comprehensible mechanisms? 
We argue that one source of inspiration might be the research on fast-and-frugal 
heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Simple strategies such as fast-and-frugal 
trees (e.g., Hafenbrädl, Waeger, Marewski, & Gigerenzer, 2016) might be well-suited for 
providing justifications for decisions made in social situations. Heuristics are not only 
meant to capture ecologically rational human decision mechanisms (see Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007), but are also transparent and comprehensible. Indeed, these heuristics 
possess a clear structure composed of simple if-then rules specifying (1) how information 
is searched within the search space, (2) when information search is stopped, and (3) how 
the final decision is made based upon the information acquired (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). 
These simple decision rules have been used to model and aid human decisions in 
numerous tasks with possible moral implications, for example, in medical diagnosis 
(Hafenbrädl et al., 2016) or classification of oncoming traffic at military checkpoints as 
hostile or friendly (Keller & Katsikopoulos, 2016). We propose that the same heuristic 
principles might be useful to engineer autonomous agents that behave in a human-like 
way. 
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